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Since the early 1960's, the Military Airlift Command has
used the award of Department of Defense airlift service con-
tracts as an incentive to encourage commercial air carriers
to commit aircraft to the mobilization base embodied in the
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. Contracts are made
in proportion to each carrier's commitment to CRAF. To price
the airlift service contracts, the Military Airlift Command
uses minimum rates it establishes especially for these con-
tracts. This approach is in dissonance with the underlying
philosophy of recent legislation deregulating the airline
industry and current Department of Defense acquisition policy.
This thesis develops a means for introducing price competition
into the contract award process consistent with the main-
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Since the early Sixties, this Nation's conventional de-
fense strategy has been based on a reduced U. S. military
presence abroad. Central to this strategy is the reliance
on airlift resources to provide a dependable capability to
rapidly deliver fighting forces and equipment to any real or
threatened conflict area anywhere in the world. The consen-
sus among military strategists is that this capability to
deploy large-scale reinforcements by air in response to a
broad range of situations in almost any location has effec-
tively multiplied the deterrent effect of all U. S. forces.
To support this strategy and to be able to respond to any
world-wide contingency, the Department of Defense (DoD)
possesses in its organic inventory an all-jet transport force
managed by the Military Airlift Command (MAC) . Currently
that force consists of 77 Galaxy C-5A and 27 6 Starlifter
C-141 aircraft. [13:9]
In the event of a wartime mobilization, however, it has
long been recognized that military resources alone are in-
sufficient to meet total airlift requirements. Moreover,
it has been repeatedly determined impractical and too costly
to maintain a level of military capability in peacetime suf-
ficient to satisfy wartime requirements. Thus, for over two
decades the commercial air carrier industry has augmented
9

military capability not only in peacetime but also during
emergencies. The advantage of civilian augmentation of
military airlift is that it can provide an effective supple-
mental capability at a minimal peacetime cost.
The concept that an effective military airlift system
must be based on a partnership between the military and com-
mercial air carriers is embodied in the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet (CRAF) program. This program establishes a procedure
whereby selected commercial airlift capabilities are identi-
fied for commitment to DoD at various stages of national
emergencies.
The basic philosophy underlying the CRAF program is that
the Nation's commercial certificated air carriers are to car-
ry, under contract to DoD, the majority of routine, channel-
type government cargo and passengers in order to permit them
to maintain in time of peace a major airlift capability to
be available in times of emergency. In recent years, DoD
has purchased annually about $250 million worth of airlift
from commercial sources. In fact, about ninety percent of
the Defense Department's passenger traffic is carried by
civilian contractors. Additionally, civilian air carriers move
significant quantities of cargo through the QUICKTRANS/LOGAIR
domestic airlift systems. (Refer to Appendix A for definitions.)
These contractor operated systems are designed to provide ex-
pedited transportation of essential materials in support of




B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The goal of the CRAF program is the maintenance of a
responsive, capable airlift mobilization base to augment
the organic military fleet to meet the Nation's total war-
time needs. Under the CRAF program, the commercial air car-
riers, by contract with MAC, commit specific aircraft to the
reserve air fleet. The extent of this commitment in terms
of the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of
the aircraft determines the amount of military passenger
and cargo traffic MAC allocates among the various carriers
participating in the CRAF program.
Price competition has not been a consideration in the
airlift contract negotiation and award process because for
the past 18 years the level of compensation carriers received
from DoD were set by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) . Re-
cently, however, the CAB ceased setting minimum rates appli-
cable to air carriage providing airlift services to DoD. As
a result, MAC has assumed the function of establishing mini-
mum uniform rates for commercial airlift services for DoD. For
Fiscal Year 198 0, MAC is continuing to award airlift ser-
vice contracts in proportion to each carrier's commit-
ment to the mobilization base. This approach, however, is in
dissonance with both the competitive philosophy inherent in
recent legislation deregulating the airline industry and DoD
acquisition policy because it does not incorporate price com-
petition into the contract award process.
11

In view of this emphasis on competition, the problem
that the Military Airlift Command, the agency responsible
for the procurement of all DoD commercial airlift service,
faces is how it can introduce some form of price competition
into the airlift contract award process without jeopardizing
the flexibility of the civilian airlift mobilization base
that the present acquisition program provides.
C. THESIS INTENT
The intent of this study is to develop and evaluate a re-
vised peacetime airlift acquisition award structure which
will not only introduce price competition into the award pro-
cess but also elicit maximum carrier support for an airlift
mobilization base responsive to DoD's needs.
The reader should note that the study was limited by a
time constraint and restricted access to research data. Ac-





In order to develop a revised contract award structure,
an understanding of the existing airlift acquisition program
was required. To obtain as much background information as
possible about MAC * s commercial airlift acquisition program,
literature searches and telephone inquiries were conducted.
The research data source used in this study included
material available at the Naval Postgraduate School Library
and by inter-library loan from the Air University, Maxwell
12

Air Force Base, Alabama. This material consisted of unclassi-
fied manuals and reports prepared by the Air Force, journals,
periodicals, books, and Congressional documents. Other material
was obtained from the Contract Airlift Division at the Head-
quarters, Military Airlift Command, Scott Air Force Base,
Illinois and the Civil Aeronautics Board. In addition, tele-
phone interviews were conducted with individuals at the Civil
Aeronautics Board, the Air Transportation Association of
America, the National Air Carriers Association, several air
carriers, and Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washing-
ton, D.C.
E . CONTENTS
The following chapter examines the civilian-military air-
lift partnership: the history of commercial airlift support
of past military operations, the development and evolution
of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program, and the past role of
the Civil Aeronautics Board in the Defense Department's ac-
quisition of commercial airlift services. Chapter III dis-
cusses the organization, operations , requirements, and present
capabilities of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. Chapter IV
traces airlift procurement policy since the inception of the
CRAF program, details the extent of DoD contracting for com-
mercial airlift services, and reviews DoD ' s present acquisi-
tion program for the acquisition of commercial airlift service.
Chapter V introduces an alternative acquisition program which
is designed to incorporate price competition into the award
13

process while simultaneously assuring DoD the ready avail-
ability of a capable airlift mobilization base. Finally,
Chapter VI summarizes this thesis.
14

II. THE CIVILIAN-MILITARY PARTNERSHIP FOR AIRLIFT
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
The partnership between the military and civilian air
carriers had its origins in the early days of World War II.
On 13 December 1941, shortly after the official U.S. entry
into the war, President Roosevelt authorized the Secretary of
War to seize from civilian firms any aircraft necessary to
pursue the war effort. The aircraft, in turn, were leased
back to their owners. Thus, companies provided the management
and operational experience necessary for the efficient conduct
of airlift operations. [12:50] Throughout the duration of
the war, commercial carriers continued to move large quanti-
ties of material and passengers. Under contract to the Army
Air Transport Command (ATC) and the Naval Air Transport Ser-
vice (NATS) , commercial carriers delivered more than four
billion passenger miles and one million cargo ton-miles and
performed more than 1.4 million flying hours for the military
overseas and in other international operations. [10:11-1-3]
The civil air industry was again called upon to provide
airlift assistance to the military during the Berlin crises.
To a large degree, the success of the Berlin Airlift is attri-
butable to the efforts of U.S. airlines, especially the then
fledgling supplemental carriers. The Berlin Airlift vividly
demonstrated the capabilities of airlift for the massive
movement of personnel and cargo on a prolonged basis. U.S.
15

airlines flew more than 600 transatlantic flights in support
of the airlift from June 1948 through May 194 9, and operated
more than 2,500 flights between West Berlin and points in
West Germany. [10:11-1-3]
One year after the Berlin crises, the commercial carriers
again responded to the call to augment military airlift forces.
During the early stages of the Korean War, civilian airlines
under contract to DoD provided the majority of the airlift re-
quired to support the war effort. As the Military Air Trans-
portation Service (MATS) increased its operational capability,
it assumed a larger role in airlifting personnel and cargo.
Nevertheless, commercial airlines transported some 67 percent
of the total air traffic, 56 percent of the freight, and 70 per-
cent of the mail airlifted to Korea. [10:11-1-3]
The experiences of World War II, the Berlin crises, and
the Korean War clearly indicated to military leaders that con-
tingencies would place requirements on organic military air-
lift resources far in excess of capability, and some permanent
form of commercial airlift augmentation would be required to
accommodate the surge of airlift requirements associated with
mobilization for future emergencies or wars. Thus, the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program arose out of the realiza-
tion that military airlift capability could not support the
total airlift requirements generated during contingency
periods.
B. EVOLUTION OF THE CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET
The lessons learned during the 194 0" s about the contri-
bution that the civil air industry could make in future
16

military engagements prompted a number of studies to be under-
taken in the late 1940' s and early 1950 's. The first of these
studies, released by the Air Coordinating Committee in 1948,
recommended the establishment of contractual arrangements be-
tween the military and civilian carriers to provide for aug-
mentation in the event the need should arise. Later, the
National Security Resources Board (NSRB) commissioned a series
of airlift studies for the purpose of designing a mobiliza-
tion base program and establishing a contractual framework
within which the airline industry would respond to national
emergencies. The NRSB report recommendations resulted in
Executive Order 10219, issued by President Truman in February
1951, which officially established the CRAF program. Respon-
sibility for developing the program rested with both the De-
partment of Commerce and the Department of Defense. DoD '
s
first plan for the establishment of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
was issued on 20 March 1952 the date which marks the beginning
of the civilian-military airlift partnership officially .
During the years immediately following the Korean War,
numerous studies were performed aimed at reviewing national
airlift policies and identifying problems. The consensus
found in these studies was that civilian airlift was vital to
both the economic and security interests of the U.S. and con-
sequently warranted expansion. As a result, the CRAF program
underwent several modifications in its early years to better
reflect the economic realities in the commercial air industry
and meet changing defense needs.
17

Soon after the CRAF program came into existence, it was
realized that in order for the Government to have a large,
modern aircraft fleet at its command during periods of con-
flict it would be necessary to employ the fleet during peace-
time. This requirement was first recognized in recommendations
contained in a report entitled "Civil Air Policy" prepared by
the Air Coordinating Committee in 1954. The basic points ex-
pressed in this study were that DoD should not compete with
private civil air carriers, but rather should make attempts
to use underutilized civilian airlift capacity especially civil
air cargo capability as it became available for routine non-
emergency use.
In 1955, the Hoover Commission issued a report which
basically reiterated the recommendations contained in the Air
Coordinating Committee's report. The Commission concluded
that such a policy would on the one hand reduce subsidies to
U. S. international air carriers while on the other hand aid
in the development of an economically self-sufficient industry
capable of providing a vast reservoir of airlift to meet mobil-
ization emergencies.
During the 1955/56 time period, several Congressional com-
mittees, noting DoD's increasing reliance on the Military Air
Transportation Service (MATS) , sought to have DoD define the
role of MATS and the civilian air carriers under the CRAF pro-
gram. Extensive and lengthy investigations were performed by
the Committee on Governmental Operations and the Committee on
Military Affairs in the House. Their basic finding was that
18

DoD must make maximum utilization of the civil air carriers
to strengthen the industry's economy and in doing so it would
be contributing to preparing the civil reserve air fleet to
meet wartime needs. Similarly, the House Appropriations
Committee, in its deliberations, emphasized the essential
role of the scheduled and non-scheduled airlines in overall
mobilization and reaffirmed the need for the Air Force in con-
ducting its transportation business to assist these carriers
to remain financially sound.
Again in 1958, the Military Operations Subcommittee of the
House Government Operations Committee undertook a comprehensive
investigation of the entire relationship between DoD and the
civil air carriers. The resulting exhaustive report produced
by the committee put forth 22 specific recommendations aimed
at strengthening overall national airlift capability. Among
the recommendations was one that would restrict DoD's use of
MATS to strictly moving outsize and special-cargo traffic and
technical missions. It was also recommended that the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet be expanded and more closely integrated with
military airlift missions. By allocating to civil air car-
riers in CRAF a larger share of DoD's cargo traffic, the reas-
oning went, the Air Force would be encouraging the civil air
carriers to procure modern cargo aircraft.
Yet another detailed investigation into CRAF was conducted
in 1960 by the Airlift Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee. The ensuing report concluded that DoD's failure to
place a greater emphasis on the utilization of civil air
19

carriers had seriously diminished the Nation's overall air-
lift industry, the Subcommittee recommended that a new pro-
curement policy be devised which would create a greater incen-
tive for carriers to modernize and expand their cargo fleets.
The civil air carrier's problems were further addressed
in a detailed DoD report issued in 1960 entitled "The Role of
Military Air Transport Service in Peace and War." This report
was produced in response to President Eisenhower's directive
to the Secretary of Defense to study the role of MATS in peace
and war. In regard to then existing procurement policies and
practices the report stated:
Current airlift procurement policies and practices
are not accomplishing the desired results in promoting
a healthy growth of the United States overseas commercial
cargo airlift capability. With Congressional approval,
if necessary, they should be better adapted to reflect
the long-term interest of the Department of Defense in
commercial airlift capability and provide continuity and
stability required for effective and economical support
of military forces. [3:138]
Further, the report proceeded to state:
Policies and practices should (1) encourage moderni-
zation and growth of commercial cargo capability, (2)
insure uninterrupted commercial airlift service to the
Department of Defense at all times; and require carriers
providing augmentation airlift to provide on request
during emergencies a fixed percentage increase in air-
lift capability over their normal commitment to MATS.
[3:138]
A number of specific "Presidentially Approved Courses of
Action" were enumerated in the report which were to serve as a
basis for the implementation of the recommended policies.
These included the limitation of MATS operations to strictly
"hardcore" traffic and the expanded use of civilian air car-
riers to move DoD passenters and cargo. To provide greater
20

incentive for expansion of the civil cargo fleet, the report
called for the elimination of competitive bidding for airlift
contracts and the substitution of Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) rate making in the area. Additionally, it proposed the
development of a formula by which a carrier's share of military
traffic would be determined by such factors as the quantity
and relative value of the aircraft committed to CRAF and the
willingness of the carrier to acquire modern cargo aircraft.
The DoD study further addressed a serious deficiency in
the original CRAF plan. As formulated, the plan called for the
total activation of the civil reserve air fleet in general war
conditions but it did not deal with a call up in situations
short of a general war. This contributed to a reluctance on
the part of carriers to commit aircraft to DoD for other than
full mobilization because of the possible adverse effects such
action might have on a carrier's competitive position within
the industry. This restriction was removed in 1963 when the
Secretaries of Defense and Commerce signed a Memorandum which
clarified and formalized the incremental activation of CRAF
under conditions other than full mobilization.
The Secretary of the Air Force convened an independent
committee, the Reed Committee, to study the MATS operation and
to submit recommendations to the Secretary on implementation
of the Presidentially Approved Courses of Action. The result-
ing report recommended that MATS procurement policies be re-
vised as follows:
1. Procure all transportation at tariff rates ap-
proved by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
21

2. Allocate all business to commercial air carriers
as defined in Section 101 (3) of the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958 who meet the following prerequisites:
(a) Are effectively committed to the CRAF pro-
gram on the basis set forth hereinafter.
(b) Have placed firm orders for modern cargo air-
craft.
(c) Have a good financial and operational record.
(d) Owns a fleet of aircraft at the time the
requirements for procurement are published.
(e) Have sufficient crews in the military re-
serve to meet CRAF commitment.
3. Provided certificated route carriers meet these
prerequisites, grant such carriers the right of first
refusal to all Department of Defense procured traffic
over the certificated route whether on an individual
basis or in plane load lots (Air Force to determine
whether traffic is to move on an individual basis or in
plane load lots) provided further such certificated car-
riers can satisfy Air Force traffic handling require-
ments at tariffs negotiated with the Department of De-
fense and approved by CAB.
4
.
To the extent to which it appears advantageous
to it, the DoD should be authorized to enter into long-
term arrangements with carriers for the handling of this
traffic at rates to be approved by the CAB. [11:194]
The Department of the Air Force responded to the Presiden-
tially Approved Courses of Action and the Reed Commission re-
port by making two fundamental changes to its airlift acquisi-
tion policies. First, the Air Force decided to limit eligibili-
ty for participation in annual airlift contracts to carriers
who were CAB certificated. Second, the Air Force proceeded
to combine its annual peacetime airlift procurement with its
standby mobilization contracts. These policies are discussed
in more detail in Chapter IV.
The policies outlined by "The Role of MATS in Peace and
War" as approved by the President and implemented pursuant to
22

his direction have been credited with substantially improving
the status of the CRAF program. Today, these same policies
continue to guide DoD in matters related to the procurement
of its commercial airlift needs.
C. THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD AND THE CIVILIAN-MILITARY
PARTNERSHIP
As discussed, the Department of Defense depends heavily
on the civil air carriers for enhancing its organic airlift
capability during contingency periods. Moreover, this reliance
on the private sector is not a new phenomenon but, in fact,
has its roots in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. Section
102 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, which amended the
193 8 Act, requires that the Board, in the discharge of its
powers and duties under the Act, consider among other things,
Competition to the extent necessary to assure the
sound development of air-transportation systems properly
adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic com-
merce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and
national defense; [4:731]
This statement of Congressional policy, then, forms the basis
for the Board's actions with respect to the civilian-military
partnership for airlift.
The Act conferred to the CAB two basic regulatory tools;
the power to license carriers to engage in air transportation
and the power to regulate rates. With regard to licensing, no
carrier can engage in domestic interstate or foreign for-hire
air transportation without a Board Certificate of Public Con-
venience and Necessity, or an exemption for the certificate
requirements of the Act.
23

The Board also has the authority to fix fair and reas-
onable rates of compensation or reasonable minimum or maximum
rates after notice and hearing. In determining and fixing such
rates, the Board is required to take into consideration the
conditions peculiar to transportation by aircraft and the
particular air carriers or class of air carriers. The Board's
power over rates is applicable only to domestic service. In
contrast, the Board's powers over international overseas air
transportation is limited to removing unjust discrimination or
undue preference or prejudice. It can neither directly fix
rates nor suspend proposed rates.
Discussions between the Board and the Department of De-
fense concerning rates began in 1958 after several complaints
from small airline companies that the then existing competitive
bidding system was inherently disadvantageous because it favored
the larger carriers. At this time, the Board maintained a non-
interventionist stance with regard to Government traffic as it
was international in nature and, as such, the Board was with-
out authority to intervene.
After further discussions in 1959, however, the CAB an-
nounced a proposal to set minimum rates for military traffic.
The method the CAB planned to use to exercise control over
rates for military augmentation airlift in foreign air trans-
portation involved conditioning the grants of exemption to car-
riers requiring them to engage in DoD business. These carriers
included the supplemental carriers who did not hold Certificates
of Public Convenience and Necessity for foreign air transporta-
tion and all cargo carriers whose certificates did not authorize
24

passenger operations. By granting exemptions only if con-
tract prices met minimum rates, the Board could control the
rates of the carriers concerned. The CAB took no action to
implement the proposal because of DoD's reluctance to endorse
it.
The situation changed in I960, however, when a revised
method of airlift procurement was adopted by MATS. As previously
discussed, this involved the substitution of negotiated bids
for competitive bidding procedures. Moreover, carriers who were
not certificated by the CAB were ineligible for MATS contracts.
Finally, contract eligibility was limited to participants in
CRAF who met the requirements set out in the Presidentially
Approved Courses of Action.
On the basis of this development, the Board announced in
June 1960 that it would discontinue issuing blanket certificate
exemptions to supplemental carriers. In place of the blanket
exemptions, the CAB instituted a procedure whereby individual
exemptions were granted on the basis of a carriers acceptance
of prescribed rates, execution of a CRAF contract, and a deter-
mination by the Air Force Secretary that contracting for civilian
airlift service in a non-competitive manner was in the best
interests of national security. In 1961 the Board implemented
this policy and established a minimum rate floor. Rates appli-
cable to military transportation were published in Title 14,
Part 288 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
The Board's justification for intervening in DoD. 1 s procure-
ment of commercial airlift was based on the objective of ensuring
25

that carriers received sufficient compensation from DoD to
maintain and continue to develop an air transport system which
would satisfy defense needs. Under the competitive bidding
system heretofore in existence, small businesses, including sup
plemental carriers who depended heavily on military revenues,
were essentially forced to enter bids below cost in order to
receive DoD contracts. This situation was described in 1961
Congressional testimony by then CAB Chairman Boyd.
The fact is that under the old system of competi-
tive bidding, without a rate floor, many aircraft
operators bid at prices that were marginal and were
even below their actual cost. This destructive bid-
ding resulted not only in a lack of adequate earnings
but also produced very substantial losses for some of
the carriers involved.
This is illustrated by the plight of Overseas
National Airways which received MATS awards well above
$20 million in the year ended September 3 0, 1960, and
lost $2,245,000 in performing service under the con-
tract, even though this carrier has always had the
reputation of being a low-cost operator.
Even larger losses were experienced by Seaboard
World Airlines, which was then known as Seaboard and
Western. World Airways also experienced losses, al-
though on a smaller scale. [15:86]
In explaining the reasons for destructive bidding by the in-
dustry seeking DoD contracts, Chairman Boyd went on to state:
Finally, for some carriers, it is literally a matter
of survival. A number of these carriers are primarily
engaged in attempting to maintain their existence in the
belief that they will be rewarded as new markets, parti-
cularly in air cargo, open up. But these carriers have
payrolls and other expenses which have to be met today.
They cannot pass up a substantial Government contract
even if it means money losses, since it will provide the
cash flow necessary to keep the organization intact. If
they are able to develop enough additional outside busi-




We do not believe that any system which allows some
competitors to cut prices to out-of-pocket cost or less
is in the long run a healthy one. Reasonable profits
are necessary to insure modernization and growth. Very
few financial institutions with money to invest will
consider the business of furnishing air transportation
to the military a reasonable risk.
Moreover, cutthroat competition introduces instability
in the market, resulting in extreme fluctuations in the
amount of MATS business awarded to any particular carrier
from year to year. Under these conditions, unregulated
competitive bidding cannot produce an adequate, modern
air fleet. [15:86]
Based on the above testimony, it is clear that the minimum rate
floor was designed to prevent individual price competition for
MATS contracts from driving rates below industry average costs
on the theory that lower rates would jeopardize the health of
some carriers and, thus, reduce the amount of airlift service
available to DoD.
Recent legislation deregulating the airline industry has
drastically altered the Board's involvement in military rate
making. Public Law 95-163, enacted 7 November 1977, removed
the CAB's authority to regulate rates for the movement of car-
go within CONUS and eased restrictions on the entry of carriers
into the interstate transportation of cargo. Moreover, the law
eliminated the Board's powers to suspend and prescribe new
cargo rates if it decided that proposed tariffs were "unjust
and unreasonable." In the past, a rate was not just or reason-
able if it was too profitable or if it did not recover reason-
able cost plus return on investment for a carrier. Finally,
the Board has interpreted the law as expressly removing the
statutory standards underlying the minimum rate structure for
QUICK TRANS /LOGAIR services.
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The deregulation which Congress initiated in air cargo was
substantially expanded with the passage of Public Law 95-504 in
October 1978. The law extended deregulation to include all
overseas international and interstate air transportation. The
legislation places considerable emphasis upon free market forces
and competition to produce within the air industry efficiency,
innovation, lower prices, a variety of price/service options,
and allow efficient, well managed carriers to earn reasonable
profits and attract capital.
In response to the legislation, the CAB performed a review
of its military rate making function under Part 28 8 and in
January 197 9 issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making announc-
ing its intention to eliminate the minimum rate provisions ap-
plicable to military airlift services provided by civilian air
carriers. The Board cited a number of reasons for the proposed
action:
First, changes in the economic circumstances of the air
charter industry appear to have eliminated any need to
protect charter air carriers from competition through
the regulation of military rates. The protection of
supplemental carriers was in large part the justification
for the adoption of Part 288 in 1961. Second, our experi-
ence with Part 288 has led us to question whether the
regulation of current military air transportation prices
is an efficient way to supply DoD with both current air
transportation and commitments to CRAF. Third, in a
series of recent statutory changes, Congress has clearly
signalled its intention to place maximum possible reli-
ance upon competitive market forces for the attainment
of satisfactory service and price levels in air trans-
portation. [2:2]
In elaborating on the second reason for its proposal,
the CAB stated that since established rates were not compensa-
tory for CRAF commitments in the long-term but only covered
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costs for air transportation provided in the current-term,
Part 288 did not give carriers an incentive to acquire and
commit aircraft to meet DoD ' s emergency needs. [2:7] More-
over, the CAB opined that in a competitive market environment,
direct contractual agreements between DoD and the air carriers
could provide both a military transportation system and a re-
serve fleet more efficiently than the present system. [2:8]
On 19 July 197 9, the CAB issued its final ruling revoking
the provisions of its Economic Regulations prescribing minimum
rates applicable to domestic and international charter service
and international individually waybilled or ticketed scheduled
service provided for the Defense Department pursuant to contract.
The ruling restated the Board's position that minimum rate re-
gulation represented by Part 288 was contrary to the statutory
mandates expressed in the air transportation deregulation bills.
[1:2] The Board also stated that by eliminating the minimum
rate structure, it was removing "an unnecessary regulatory bar-
rier preventing the carriers from negotiating directly and ex-
peditiously with DoD to determine the reasonable price to be
paid for their services." [1:4]
In the absence of established rates for pricing airlift
services, the Military Airlift Command has assumed the Board's
rate making functions. The basis for MAC's rate making method
is a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) entered into by MAC and
each carrier desiring to provide domestic and international
contract service. [See Appendix B.] Under the MOU, carriers
interested in providing airlift service to DoD and willing to
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participate in the mobilization base program agree to provide
cost information to MAC. This cost information is applied to
a CAB rate making methodology to establish a MAC uniform negoti-
ated rate with which to price commercial airlift contracts. In
the event that MAC and the carriers are unable to resolve dis-
agreements arising during the process of negotiation, the MOU
states that issues are to be referred to no lower a level then
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for final resolution.
Appeneix A is the proposed "MAC Schedule of Negotiated Uniform




III. THE CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET: COMPOSITION,
REQUIREMENTS , AND CAPABILITIES
As previously discussed, military organic airlift resources
have been complemented for many years by the resources of the
Civil Reserve Air Fleet. These CRAF resources, moreover, have
contributed substantially to national strategic airlift capabi-
lity. Currently, CRAF accounts for over one-half the total
strategic airlift capability available to the U.S. in the event
of national emergency or war. [13:2 0]
The relative contributions of both civilian and military
resources to total airlift capability is illustrated in Figure
1. Peacetime military organic capability is based on a utili-
zation rate of about two hours per day for C-5 aircraft and three
hours per day for C-141 aircraft. The crises military organic
capability is predicated on wartime surge utilization rates of
12.5 hours daily per aircraft. The CRAF cargo and passenger
capabilities represent airlift capabilities generated by total
CRAF activation at a contractually specified utilization rate
of 10 hours daily per aircraft. Finally, the national passenger
capability includes civil long-range passenger capability which
is not committed to CRAF.
Depending on aircraft operating characteristics, alloca-
tion of aircraft within CRAF is made to one of four segments
which are basically geographic in nature. Accordingly, air-
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Figure 1. Total Strategic Ton-Mile Capability
(Billions/Year)
Source: Headquarters, Military Airlift Command [5]
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Short-Range International (SRI), Domestic, or Alaskan portions
of the program.
Since the major objective of CRAF is to augment MAC '
s
strategic airlift capability, satisfying requirements for the
Long-Range International segment receives primary emphasis.
Those aircraft capable of providing airlift in support of
MAC's world-wide mission requirements include Boeing B-747's
and 7 07's, Lockheed L-l Oil's, and McDonnell Douglas DC-8 '
and DC-10's. These aircraft are all capable of extended over-
water operations and can transport a productive payload over
the desired 3 500 nautical mile (NM) range. Due to the current
shortage of cargo capable aircraft, however, all cargo-capable
aircraft with a 23 00 NM productive range—the distance from
the West Coast to Hawaii—are accepted in the long-range fleet.
Thus, Boeing B-727QC's are also included in this segment.
When activated, CRAF's Short-Range International segment
supports MAC's intra-theater cargo and passenger airlift re-
quirements. In addition, this segment also accommodates short-
haul operations between CONUS and reasonably close offshore
locations such as the Caribbean, Greenland, and Iceland. The
SRI fleet is composed entirely of convertible B-727's. These
aircraft have a 1500 NM productive range.
The Domestic segment provides the Navy and Air Force with
separate, scheduled cargo airlift systems connecting various
military installations, supply depots, and commercial airfields
within CONUS. The QUICKTRANS system is a contractor operated
air logistics pipeline designed to satisfy the Navy's require-
ments for the expeditious movement of urgent, high-priority
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material. LOGAIR, the equivalent Air Force air logistics system,
similarly relies on commercial carriers under contract to provide
expedited transportation for essential materials. The Domestic
requirements are served by a combination fleet of B-727's,
DC-9's, L-188's, and L-100's.
Finally, the Alaskan segment of CRAF satisfies intra-
Alaskan airlift requirements of the Alaskan Air Command and
Distant Early Warning radar site support for the Aerospace
Defense Command. It is composed of jet, turboprop, and piston-
powered aircraft suitable for shortfield operations in locations
without extensive ground support.
Currently, there are twenty-one carriers participating in
the CRAF program under mobilization base contracts. Table I
lists these carriers according to CRAF segment and shows the
number of aircraft each carrier has committed to CRAF by stage.
Under the provisions of CRAF contracts, carriers are bound
to respond to progressively increasing requirements in three
stages of emergency. The specific number of aircraft committed
to each stage of CRAF activation is contractually stipulated.
The stages are:
° Stage I - Within 24 hours of a declaration of the
requirement for these assets by the Commander in
Chief, Military Airlift Command (CINCMAC) , carriers
must make committed aircraft available for service.
This stage is basically an extension of commercial
service already available to MAC. It involves LRI
identified aircraft only.
- Stage II - Within 24 hours of call up by the Secre-
tary of Defense for emergencies not requiring full
mobilization, aircraft committed to this stage must
be made available for service. When this stage is
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and SRI CRAF segments involved, but also some
aircraft committed to the Domestic and Alaskan
Service segments.
° Stage III - Within 48 hours of activation of this
stage, aTl CRAF resources must be provided to DoD
.
This stage is activated by order of the Secretary
of Defense in time of war or during an unlimited
national or civil defense emergency declared by the
President or Congress.
CRAF requirements are based on contingency plans established
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) . Under JCS operational con-
cepts, strategic airlift forces are tailored to meet specific
requirements and varying contingencies around the world. It
is these requirements that fix the composition of CRAF. The
specific types and numbers of aircraft required to support JCS
approved contingency plans are determined by MAC and forwarded
to the Director, Office of Emergency Transportation (OET) , De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) who, in turn, allocates the
aircraft to CRAF by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
registration number.
The requirements that must be satisfied in each of the
three stages of CRAF activation are set forth in Table II.
These requirements are expressed in B-747 equivalents. Note
that since the requirement for cargo capability at Stage III
exceeds the total existing available capability, all cargo
aircraft offered are accepted.
These requirements, in turn, are satisfied by a variety
of aircraft types in the inventories of airlines participating
in the CRAF program. Table III shows the international CRAF
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1/ 118 required; 7 5 offered
2/ 96 percent wide-bodied passenger aircraft;
4 percent narrow-bodied aircraft


































1/ 26 potential bulk cargo;
capability 3.7 MTM/day
Source: Headquarters, Military Airlift Command [5 ]
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each of the three stages of CRAF. The total capability these
aircraft represent to Stage III is 144.4 million passenger-
miles and 15.3 million ton-miles per day.
While the combination of military and CRAF resources consti-
tutes a tremendous strategic airlift capability, continuing
studies indicate that this capability is inadequate to satisfy
established contingency requirements. Moreover, national stra-
tegic airlift capability is particularly deficient in total cargo
transportation capability. A contributing factor has been the
Defense Department's doubling of the projected strategic air-
lift requirement from 180,000 to 370,000 tons of cargo to Europe
in 30 days. [16:2557]
Today, CRAF ' s cargo capability is insufficient to satisfy
the requirements levied upon it. Of the 37 6 long-range aircraft
in CRAF, only 143 are cargo capable. The shortfall is most severe
in CRAF ' s ability to transport oversize and outsize cargo. Out-
size cargo includes equipment and material that is too large
to be loaded on standard military airfreight pallets but can
be carried aboard organic military transports or wide-bodied
CRAF aircraft such as the DC-10 or B-747. The five-ton truck
is an example of oversize cargo. Larger equipment, e.g. tanks
and self-propelled guns, is classified as outsize. The C-5 is
the only aircraft capable of transporting outsize equipment.
Currently, the majority of CRAF aircraft are of narrow-body
design capable only of transporting bulk cargo, i.e. equip-
ment and material which can be loaded on airfreight pallets.
There are only a limited number of wide-bodied CRAF aircraft




A number of airlift enhancement programs have been proposed
by the Air Force to increase strategic airlift capability.
These include (1) C-5 wing modification, (2) C-141 "stretch,"
(3) procurement of advanced tanker/cargo aircraft, and (4)
CRAF modification. The CRAF modification plan was developed
by the Air Force in 1974 as a means of significantly increas-
ing strategic cargo capability. Under the plan, about 110
commercial wide-bodied jet aircraft, such as the B-747, DC-10,
and L-1011, would be modified to incorporate cargo convertibi-
lity features. Additionally, the Air Force would defray the
added operating costs and revenues lost due to the reduced
payloads of modified aircraft, and revenues lost by the car-
riers during the period aircraft were undergoing modification.
For a total ten year outlay of between $450 million to $600
million in 1978 dollars, it was estimated that CRAF oversize
capability would increase threefold. [14:48]
In 1977, the CRAF modification plan was revived with the
introduction of H.R. 2637 into Congress. This legislation
would have authorized the Secretary of the Air Force to estab-
lish a program to encourage civilian air carriers to acquire
additional cargo capabity in either their existing or future
fleets. In general, the bill would have authorized limited
federal financial support for (1) purchase of new cargo planes
or passenger aircraft with cargo convertible features, i.e.
large cargo doors and reinforced flooring, and (2) the installa-
tion of similar features in existing passenger aircraft. More-
over, the bill would have given the Secretary of the Air Force
39

the authority to enter into long-term contractual agreements
providing funds for annual payments to compensate carriers
for the additional operating costs and reduced payloads associ-
ated with aircraft modifications.
Aircraft purchased or modified under the program would
not be allowed to share as cargo aircraft in the annual distri-
bution of MAC contracts. The legislation, however, offered
annual payments to carriers who were not sharing in DoD ' s peace-
time airlift business as an incentive to commit aircraft to
Stage III.
While the House of Representatives passed authorizing
legislation, the Senate did not act on the measure. Instead,
Congress appropriated $7.5 million in fiscal year 197 9 to fund
a demonstration program involving modification of one aircraft.
In its fiscal year 198 budget, DoD proposed modification of
nine new aircraft. Eventually, DoD hopes to modify sufficient
aircraft to equal the capacity of 65 B-747's. [13:33]
The CRAF modification program offers an extremely cost
effective approach to increasing airlift capacity. Once the
cargo features have been installed and compensation and incen-
tive payments made to participating carriers, the modification




IV. THE ACQUISITION OF COMMERCIAL AIRLIFT
A. BACKGROUND
During the Fifties, the Military Airlift Command's annual
commercial airlift contracts were entirely separate from CRAF
mobilization base contracts. Moreover, MAC contracted for
commercial services with both regulated and unregulated car-
riers who competitively bid for military airlift business.
Carrier participation in the CRAF program was not requisite
for eligibility to bid and no preference was given to carriers
committed to CRAF in the award of contracts. The CRAF contracts
took the form of cost-plus-fixed-fee standby contracts under
which DoD could only call for service on a full mobilization
basis
.
In 1956 and 1957, DoD shifted to a system of call con-
tracts to obtain the greater part of its commercial airlift
augmentation. These contracts set forth the general provisions
and operating conditions which would apply if DoD purchased
airlift services from the contractor and committed neither DoD
to offer the service nor the carrier to provide the service. As
requirements arose, carriers were invited to submit bids for the
business. Carriers with the lowest cost offers received the
contract awards.
Beginning in 1958, however, the Defense Department began
procuring more of its airlift on a firm six-month or twelve-
month contractual basis. Companies on bidders lists were
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advised of the requirements to fill the fixed contracts and
invited to submit bids under which they would perform some or
all of the service. Separate expansion service contracts
were awarded to accommodate requirements in excess of the
fixed buy.
As discussed earlier, the Civil Aeronautics Board viewed
these procurement practices as detrimental to the financial
health of some air carriers who were given to destructive bid-
ding practices in an attempt to acquire DoD contracts. Like-
wise, DoD concluded that these procurement practices contri-
buted to an airlift augmentation system that was unresponsive
to its needs.
Present acquisition policy continues to reflect the guide-
lines set down by the President and the Congress in the early
1960's. Today, CRAF carriers continue to be contractually
committed to participate in the incremental activation of CRAF
through an acquisition process which combines the annual pro-
curement of commercial airlift from civilian firms with the
CRAF mobilization base contracts.
B. THE INDUSTRY'S PORTION OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AIRLIFT
TRAFFIC
Since the Department of Defense is the civil air car-
rier's single largest customer, the amount of business it
annually offers has considerable importance to the industry.
In fiscal year 1968, the peak year for commercial airlift pro-
curement, DoD contracts provided almost ten percent of the
industry's revenues for that year. In the post-Vietnam years,
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however, DoD's commercial airlift contracts have declined to
a point where they currently represent about one percent of
the industry's total revenues.
Table IV summarizes DoD channel cargo and passenger move-
ment internationally by civil air carriers since 1960. Begin-
ning in 1966, civil air carriers have regularly received over
80 percent of DoD's international passenger traffic business.
In contrast, the percentage of DoD cargo transported by civil
air carriers has never achieved such proportions. The civil
air carrier's share of international military cargo reached a
peak in 1962 when they carried 48.7 percent of the total. In
the Vietnam era that followed, the total volume of military
cargo increased substantially, but tiie percentage handled by
CRAF carriers dropped. In fiscal year 1967, commercial air
carriers flew a peak of 1,173,990 ton-miles or 38.8 percent of
the total military cargo airlifted that year. In 1969, however,
this trend reversed and the amount of DoD cargo moved inter-
nationally by civil air carriers plunged.
The reduction in the cargo tonnage moved and to a lesser
extent the smaller number of military passengers moved by civil
air carriers is, of course, partly attributable to the end of
the Vietnam War. This, however, is not the entire reason. The
reduction has also been caused by the decline in the number of
troops stationed overseas. Additionally, the escalating cost
of airlift has prompted use of lower cost surface transportation
by DoD components. Finally, concurrent with DoD's declining
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airlift capability was drastically expanded with the addition
of the C-5 aircraft to the MAC fleet.
The effect of these events on the level of MAC ' s interna-
tional civil airlift procurement is clearly evident in Figure
2. In fiscal year 1967, the peak year for DoD commercial air-
lift procurement, $594.5 million was expended for international
airlift. More recently, the level of DoD business awarded to
civil air carriers for long-range international airlift ser-
vices has stabilized at about $200 million annually. In con-
trast, as depicted in Figure 3, the total level of contracting
for domestic airlift has remained relatively constant since 1969.
This precipitous decline in post-Vietnam international
airlift procurement has produced a dilemma. On the one hand,
procurement of airlift services from the commercial sector is
intended to encourage carriers to improve and expand their
airlift resources. On the other hand, military organic airlift
capability has substantially increased. As a result, very lit-
tle overseas cargo business is offered civil air carriers be-
cause, even at the low utilization rates of C-5 and C-141 air-
craft necessary to maintain military readiness, most of the car-
go movement DoD requires can be accommodated by these MAC assets.
Thus, DoD has primarily contracted with the commercial carriers
for passenger services.
The air carriers have contended that the DoD passenger
traffic alone is insufficient to maintain and expand airlift
capacity necessary to augment military resources in contingencies
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Figure 2. MAC International Civil Airlift Procurement
FY 1960 - FY 1976
Sources: The Sec!-irte of Supplemental Air Carriers in the
United States_ [17:93 0]






1/ Includes fiscal year 7T
Figure 3. MAC Domestic Civil Airlift Procurement
FY 1969 - FY 1979
SOURCE: Headquarters, Military Airlift Command [9]
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is required to produce the necessary capability. Moreover,
the airlines have also claimed that MAC is operating an airline
in direct competition with the civil air carriers and in doing
so, MAC is violating the policies established and supported by
the President and Congress ever since the early Sixties. Final-
ly, the industry maintains that the shortfall in cargo airlift
capability which exists is the result of DoD ' s failure to make
use of the incentives made available by the Congressionally-
mandated commercial airlift program.
In the past, legislation has been proposed to resolve this
dilemma. Senate Bill 18 21, introduced in 1971, would have re-
quired the Department of Defense to contract for at least 4
percent of its international cargo airlift with commercial air
carriers. Eventually defeated in 1972, it was followed by Senate
Bill 13 50 and House Bill 508 5 in 1973 which contained similar
provisions. These attempts at legislating a fixed percentage of
DoD cargo business for the commercial carriers also failed.
As commercial air carriers cannot obtain sufficient cargo
business from either civilian or DoD sources to enable them to
build and maintain in peacetime a reserve air fleet capable of
meeting presently established wartime needs, it appears that the
CRAF modification program, mentioned earlier, holds the most
promise for resolving the dilemma. It will permit MAC to main-
tain essential military readiness while contemporaneously as-




C. THE COMMERCIAL AIRLIFT ACQUISITION PROCESS
The present system of Department of Defense negotiated airlift
services acquisition, including both domestic and international
air transportation (long- and short-range) , is accomplished un-
der the mobilization base authority of the Armed Services Pro-
curement Act—10 USC 23 04 (a) (16) . On the basis of a Secre-
tarial Determination and Finding, annual airlift service needs
and airlift mobilization base requirements for national defense
are met by a single contract.
As the single manager operating agency for airlift service
in support of DoD requirements, one of MAC ' s responsibilities
with respect to the CRAF program is the preparation, negotiation,
and administration of airlift contracts. The Commander-in-
Chief, Military Airlift Command, as the DoD executive agent
for airlift, annually negotiates one of two kinds of contracts
with air carriers in the CRAF program—fixed-buy or expansion.
The fixed-buy contract covers DoD's regular purchase of
peacetime airlift services. This represents a firm or guar-
anteed airlift purchase for requirements anticipated in advance.
Annually, each of the Service components prepares an airlift
requirements forecast which serves as the basis for the amount
of fixed-buy airlift contracts. Furthermore, the provisions
of the fixed-buy contracts provide for the purchase of addition-
al airlift to satisfy short-notice requirements as they arise.
Under the provisions of airlift contracts, DoD has the right to
order this expansion service; contractors, however, are not
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bound to offer the service. Figure 4 compares the volume of
international airlift which is fixed-buy and expansion. Fin-
ally, fixed-buy contracts bind air carriers to provide specific
aircraft to each of the three stages of CRAF activation.
The second contract type—the call contract— is negotiated
with carriers which elect not to receive normal peacetime DoD
business. However, under contractual agreement, these carriers
obligate themselves to make available to DoD aircraft for Stage
III CRAF activation. In fiscal year 1979, seven contractors
entered into call contracts.
Eligibility to provide contract airlift service to DoD is
predicated on a carrier's holding a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity issued by the CAB under section 4 01 of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958. In addition, prospective contractors
must possess aircraft which are of U.S. registry and suitable
for CRAF allocation. Moreover, the aircraft offered by a con-
tractor must be subject to its control as of the date of its
offer and for the full term of the contract.
Yearly, MAC issues Requests for Proposals (RFP) to eligible
carriers to solicit the required cargo and passenger airlift
services. Separate solicitations are made for each of the re-
quired services—long-range international, domestic (QUICKTRANS
and LOGAIR independently) , short-range international, and Alas-
kan. These solicitations lead to the award of definite-quantity-
fixed-unit-price type contracts.
The international RFP schedule itemizes the required airlift



































































































route in each month. Carriers can submit offers on as many
items, either in total or part, as they choose. This gives
carriers the opportunity to select those routes which closely
approximate the routes they already fly. When making awards,
MAC takes a carrier's route desires into consideration. The
domestic RFP schedule differs in that it itemizes the routes,
and the regular days and times at which service must be pro-
vided. Additionally, carriers must offer on the total quantity
of an item.
Under the CRAF program, the participants are contractually
committed to provide specific aircraft to each of the stages
of CRAF activation. In return, MAC allocates military cargo
and passenger business according to a complex formula which
basically relates the amount of traffic awarded to an individual
carrier to that carrier's contribution to CRAF in terms of
number, types, and performance characteristics of aircraft.
1. Airlift Service Award Evaluation
The initial amount of business offered to each contrac-
tor for long-range international service is based on the number
of aircraft that the carrier is making available for acceptance
by DoD to meet contractual commitments for airlift services
that may occur at mobilization base levels I through III. In
computing the initial amount of business given to each carrier,
credit is given for aircraft assigned to Stage III only if
those aircraft have also been offered by the contractor for
Stages I and II. The amount of business offered initially to
each contractor for (1) short-range international, and (2)
52

domestic service is computed separately on the basis of the
number of aircraft offered and accepted for mobilization base
II. Alaskan requirements are negotiated separately with the
view of obtaining the commitment of aircraft to Stages II and
III of CRAF.
Several other factors are also taken into consideration
when determining award amounts. These include: (1) a carrier's
agreement to utilize MAC uniform negotiated rates, (2) the ex-
tent to which a carrier has been successful in arranging for
"no work stoppage" agreements with its employees to minimize
disruption of DoD airlift services during labor disputes, and
(3) a carrier's realization of at least 60 percent of its total
air transportation revenues from commercial, non-defense sources.
Finally, with respect to award evaluation, bonus credits
are given to carriers who have placed firm orders for wide-
bodied convertible or freighter aircraft, either new or modi-
fied from an existing passenger-only configured aircraft. The
bonus credit is equal to 100 percent of the normal mobilization
value for the first year after delivery. In addition, carriers
acquiring convertible aircraft receive a 50 percent bonus cre-
dit for a period of four years after the first year.
2. The Mobilization Base Index
Contracts for airlift are awarded on the basis of Mobi-
lization Base Index (MBI) points. This index provides award
differentials for the various types of aircraft and the differ-
ing versions (passenger, convertible, or cargo) for each type.
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For the purpose of awarding long-range international
airlift contracts, each type of aircraft is assigned a mobili-
zation value which reflects the relative value DoD places on
its capacity. Capacity is measured in terms of (1) the carry-
ing capacity or payload of an aircraft at 3 500 NM, taking into
account both the aircraft cabin load (ACL) at that range and
the practicable usable cube, (2) block speed (the average of
cruising speed and the lower take-off and landing approach
speeds) of each aircraft at 3500 NM, and (3) configuration and
convertibility of each aircraft offered.
The mobilization value for convertible and cargo air-
craft is determined by a calculation. Using the B-7 07 as the
base aircraft, the above characteristics are first converted
to weighted values—mobilization value (MV) factors for weight,
cube, and speed—which reflect the relative capacities of each
aircraft type. For example, the B-747-200C is assigned a cube
factor of 4.71 since its cubic capacity is 4.71 times that of
a B-7 07. The weight and cube factors are then combined into an
overall payload factor for each aircraft type. In recognition
of configuration, incentive factors of 100 percent for converti-
ble aircraft and 8 percent for cargo-only aircraft are assigned.
The MV is then computed using the following formula:
Payload Factor X Speed Factor X Incentive Factor = MV
The mobilization value for passenger aircraft is com-
puted in the same manner. In this instance, however, the air-
craft characteristics given MV factors include passenger
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payload, lower lobe cargo capacity, and aircraft block speed.
The aircraft MV is calculated using the following formula
which includes the configuration incentive factor of 4 per-
cent for passengers and 8 percent for cargo.
Passenger Speed Factor X Incentive Factor X 10 = PAX MVFactor c
Lower Lobe Speed Factor X Incentive Factor X 10 = Cargo MVCargo Factor r a
Aircraft MV
Table V lists the mobilization values for each aircraft type in
the CRAF program.
A carrier's total award index is computed by summing
its Stages I, II, and III mobilization points. The percentage
this equals of the total award indices for all carriers in the
amount of the total long-range international requirement which
is awarded in terms of dollars, both as fixed-buy and expansion.
In computing the final award amounts, however, no more than 10
percent of the award points are assigned to accepted passenger
aircraft.
The total dollar amounts awarded to carriers for
domestic contracts is determined separately using a similar
procedure.
D. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT AIRLIFT ACQUISITION PROGRAM
To briefly recapitulate: the purpose of the current airlift
acquisition program is to (1) encourage U.S. air carriers to
procure the types of up-to-date convertible and cargo aircraft






Type of Aircraft Convertible Cargo Passenger
B747-200F Cargo - 29.425-31.985
B747-200C Conv 35.842
B747-100F Cargo - 26.760-29.058
B747 PAX - 3.867 9.292
DC-10-40C Conv 23.496 18.797
DC-10-40 PAX - 2.232 6.984
DC-10-30CF Conv 24.173-24.577 19.338-19.662
DC-8-63 12.060 9.648 5.308
DC-8-50 9.200 7.360







Sources: International Air Transportation Services (long-
range) [7:D9,D10]
Domestic Air Transportation Services (QUICKTRANS)
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the civilian airlift mobilization base, (2) assure that the
prices DoD pays for airlift services during both peacetime and
contingency periods are fair and reasonable, and (3) provide
for an orderly, incremental civilian airlift augmentation, in
stages up to and including full wartime mobilization. At this
time, it is appropriate to ask if the existing program in fact
supports these goals.
First, it is apparent that the existing acquisition program
no longer serves to encourage air carriers to purchase converti-
ble or cargo aircraft. In the past, when the total dollar
amount of MAC awarded airlift contracts was significantly
higher and the purchase price of new aircraft was appreciably
lower, the acquisition program offered a much greater incentive
for air carriers to procure CRAF suitable aircraft. Today, how-
ever, with the purchase price of a convertible B-747 exceeding
$70 million, it is evident that the current acquisition levels
—
about $200 million annually for long-range airlift services
—
will not motivate air carriers in CRAF to procure convertible
or cargo aircraft.
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the bonus credits
given carriers as a reward for the purchase of new aircraft has
not influenced the procurement practices of the air carriers.
The long-lead times associated with the purchase of new aircraft
today—in some instances a total of five years from date of
order until delivery—renders the bonus credits ineffective as
incentives because they only enter into the award determination
beginning in the year the aircraft is delivered. Additionally,
57

the high investment per dollar of MAC peacetime business has
relegated this incentive to an insignificant factor in an air
carrier's decision to purchase a wide-bodied, cargo-capable
aircraft.
Similarly, the airlift acquisition program has not been
effective in broadening the mobilization base of the domestic
component of CRAF. The number of carriers eligible to partici-
pate in domestic contracts is limited by aircraft requirements,
and the contract award structure and rules. As a result, only
four carriers are currently engaged in domestic airlift service
for DoD. Because of the small number of air carriers offering
DoD domestic airlift service, the award of contracts on the
basis of the Mobilization Base Index leads to the allocation
of most of the business to a single large contractor. The Mili-
tary Airlift Command has recognized the problem inherent in
relying strictly on the MBI for award distribution, that is,
the vulnerability of service disruption when only one carrier is
providing most of the airlift service. Accordingly, in determin-
ing tentative dollar awards, MAC considers first the broadening
of the mobilization base and second the effectiveness of route
operations. To the extent necessary, these considerations take
precedence over the MBI.
Second, the minimum rates applicable to DoD airlift con-
tracts are based on the actual costs incurred by the air car-
riers performing services for the Government plus a reasonable
rate of return on the carrier's investment in equipment used
to serve DoD. As the rates are computed on the basis of average
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costs of all CRAF participants, use of the rates to price
contracts neglects both the circumstances of individual car-
riers and the market environment in which they operate. Con-
sequently, the present award structure neither rewards nor
provides an incentive for efficient carrier operations. More-
over, it does not encourage DoD to utilize the more efficient
air carriers. It may be argued that the costs incurred for
airlift services may have been higher than if compensatory
rates were paid to efficient carriers.
Third, the present acquisition program does provide an
effective. system for an orderly commercial augmentation of
DoD. It should be noted, however, that in the 16 years since
the adoption of the incremental mobilization system, activa-
tion of CRAF has not occurred. Commercial air carriers have
voluntarily increased service levels to the extent necessary to
satisfy DoD requirements. During the height of the Vietnam
War, air carriers provided DoD with airlift services at a level
not too far below that which would have been provided with
activation of Stage I of CRAF. The stimulus for airlines to
respond voluntarily to DoD's needs stems from the fact that
when CRAF is activated, operational control of aircraft com-
mitted to a particular stage activated reverts to MAC. Thus,
air carriers can avoid the loss of operational control of their




V. A PROPOSAL TO INTRODUCE PRICE COMPETITION
INTO THE ACQUISITION OF COMMERCIAL AIRLIFT
As discussed in the preceding chapter, it has been the
policy of the Department of Defense for the past 18 years to
award airlift contracts on the basis of non-competitive negoti-
ation. Until recently, the Civil Aeronautics Board set the
rates used to price DoD airlift service contracts. This pre-
cluded price competition from being used to determine the
distribution of airlift service awards among eligible carriers.
Instead, an air carrier's willingness to contribute to CRAF
determines the dollar amount of its award.
In the absence of CAB established rates, the Military Air-
lift Command has developed its own uniform negotiated rates,
the equivalent of Part 288 rates, with which to price DoD
airlift service contracts. The Military Airlift Command chose
to adopt this method of pricing airlift contracts because of
its concern over the possible effects that the use of price
competition might have on the CRAF participant's willingness
to commit aircraft to the mobilization base. Provided certain
criteria are met, the existing acquisition program guarantees
some airlift business to all eligible carriers submitting
offers.
The objective of this section is to develop and evaluate a
revised contract award structure which not only introduces price
competition into the award process but also continues to provide
an incentive for air carriers to commit aircraft to the
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mobilization base. The award structure described below is en-
visioned as a means of achieving the aforementioned objectives.
A. ASSUMPTIONS
To permit development of a revised award structure, certain
assumptions were made. The assumptions listed below are central
to the discussion which follows.
1. The CRAF modification program as described in Chapter
III will receive Congressional approval. Additionally, in its
final form, the program will require participating carriers to
commit modified aircraft to Stage III.
2. The quantity of commercial airlift service for which
MAC contracts annually will remain at current levels.
3. The airlift requirements to be satisfied by the civilian
airlift mobilization base are not expected to change appreciably.
4. The CRAF air carriers comprising the market actively want
DoD airlift contracts and are therefore willing to price com-
petitively to get them. Presently, one-third of the CRAF car-
riers do not participate in MAC'S peacetime airlift business.
B. THE REVISED AWARD STRUCTURE
The maintenance of a broad civilian airlift mobilization
base, responsive to DoD's requirements, dictates that the ac-
quisition of commercial airlift by negotiation be continued.
However, the negotiation could be made competitive by means of
a revised award structure which uses the price of the services
offered instead of the Mobilization Base Index as the primary
factor cetermining the dollar amounts of awards carriers receive.
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To ensure the availability of this mobilization base to
DoD, air carriers would be required to commit a certain percent-
age of their cargo and passenger aircraft fleets to Stages II
and III in order to establish an eligibility to submit offers
to DoD for peacetime airlift business. So that the broadest
possible mobilization base is achieved, aircraft already com-
mitted to Stage III by the CRAF modification program could not
be used to satisfy this requirement. Air carriers would agree
to make designated aircraft available for service within 24 and
48 hours, respectively, of the activation of Stage II or III.
Additionally, carriers would be required to establish their
ability to provide these aircraft either by ownership, or through
lease or subcontract arrangements.
Each of the required services—Long-range International,
Short-range International, Domestic, and Alaskan—would continue
to be contracted for separately. So as to distribute business
among the maximum number of air carriers, however, Long-range
International cargo and passenger requirements would become the
object of separate solicitations.
The definite quantity contracts that MAC presently employs
would be replaced by indefinite quantity contracts. As MAC
knows neither the exact time nor the exact quantity of airlift
it might require during the course of a year, the indefinite
quantity contract is well suited for the acquisition of this
service.
Under an indefinite quantity contract, MAC would guarantee
each carrier receiving an award that it would order a minimum
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amount of airlift service, which might include no service,
during the contract period. The total of the minimum airlift
service quantities would be sufficient to satisfy DoD ' s antici-
pated requirements—equivalent to the current fixed-buy quantity.
In addition, each contract would specify the maximum quantity of
airlift service that each carrier might be called upon to pro-
vide. The maximum airlift service quantities when summed would
equal the total airlift capability presently available to DoD
by activation of Stage I. Air carriers would provide service
over the minimum specified in their contracts pursuant to an
order placed by MAC.
In its annual Request for Proposal, MAC would indicate anti-
cipated passenger- and ton-mile requirements. The solicitation
would require air carriers to submit offers on a step-wise basis
and to specify a pricing structure for intermediate levels.
Thus, air carrier's offers would respond with a price for each
step, i.e. quantity of passenger- or ton-miles, as applicable,
specified in the RFP. Air carriers would also indicate how they
propose to establish a price if they are offered a quantity of
airlift service that does not correspond to a step. In the
event that a carrier does not desire to participate in DoD's
peacetime business, MAC would give it the option of entering
into a call contract under which the carrier would be obligated
to provide aircraft to DoD service should Stage III activation
occur.
After prospective contractors have submitted offers stating
the number of passenger- and ton-miles, as applicable, that they
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are bidding on and their price offer for each category, nego-
tiations would be conducted with carriers who fall within a
competitive range established by MAC. If analysis of the of-
fers indicates that the prices are reasonable in comparison with
current or recent prices for the same services procured in the
same quantities under competitive conditions, individual offers
would then be assessed by price analysis techniques. However,
if this is not the case, MAC would perform a detailed review
and analysis of all cost data submitted by offerors in support
of their price quotations.
The lowest responsible and responsive offeror (s) would re-
ceive award (s) specifying the largest minimum and maximum air-
lift service quantities. As is presently the case, the total
dollar amount of an award would be restricted so that an air
carrier received no more than 4 percent of its total revenues
from the Government. This reflects the requirement that air
carriers be capable of providing greatly expanded contingency
services. The contract awards would be firm-fixed price with
escalation to permit adjustments for increases in fuel prices.
After MAC has provided the carriers with their quaranteed
share of the airlift business, it would then place orders for
additional airlift services with the contractor who offered
the lowest price. When the maximum quantity specified in the
contract is reached, MAC would then begin placing orders for
additional service with the next lowest offeror. This process
would be repeated as often as necessary to satisfy airlift re-
quirements. If a carrier is unable to provide the requested
service, it would be required to arrange for substitute service.
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In the event of activation of Stage II and III, carriers
would provide service to DoD at uniform rates established by
MAC. These rates would be based on average costs for all
CRAF carriers.
C. DISCUSSION
The contract award structure described in the preceding
section does incorporate price competition into the acquisition
process while also ensuring the availability of a responsive
civilian airlift mobilization base to DoD. The ensuing discus-
sion evaluates the introduction of price competition into the
award process.
One of the significant advantages in the competitive ap-
proach is that it provides an incentive for all participating
carriers to submit lower offers which, from DoD's standpoint,
will favorably affect the total cost of commercial airlift.
Additionally, carriers with more efficient operations would
benefit because they would be able to secure a larger percentage
of DoD's cargo and passenger traffic. However, the revised a-
ward structure prevents a carrier from becoming too dependent
on DoD airlift contracts by restricting the total dollar amount
of business the carrier can receive to a percentage of its total
revenues
.
Conversely, no real competition for DoD contracts may cur-
rently occur because the air carriers are unable to submit offers,
The recent surge in traffic experience by the airline industry
has taxed some carriers to the point where they have no idle
capacity. Under such circumstances, a carrier would be reluctant
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to make a commitment to provide airlift service to DoD on an
indefinite quantity contract basis. In order to give it the
flexibility to respond to DoD ' s requirements, a carrier might
have to lease additional aircraft or hire additional air crews.
Consequently, if offers are made at all, they will be at prices
that include all manner of contingencies. As a result, DoD
could expect to pay more for required airlift services.
Another advantage is that the proposed award structure also
ensures the availability of peacetime expansion airlift to DoD.
Under indefinite delivery contracts, contractors would be re-
quired to provide service up to a contractually specified maxi-
mum quantity whereas presently they can decline to provide DoD
with expansion service. Thus, the recently experienced diffi-
culties in obtaining expansion service could be averted. Addi-
tionally, indefinite delivery contracts would obviate the need
for Stage I because airlift service at that level already would
be specified in the contracts.
Further, the proposed award structure would also assure
DoD the availability of a responsive civilian mobilization
base. This stems from the requirement that carriers commit a
certain percentage of their fleets to the mobilization base in
order to establish eligibility to submit offers for DoD airlift
business. Additionally, an orderly augmentation process up to
and including full mobilization is retained.
Finally, an oft repeated argument against the introduction
of price competition in the airlift acquisition process is that
in the past it produced dismal results. It lead to destructive
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bidding among some carriers seeking DoD airlift business and
in the final analysis it had an adverse effect on the civilian
airlift mobilization base. However, since the late 1950'
s
the airline industry has undergone a significant change in
its nature and composition. Deregulation of the airline
industry has brought further change. The price competition
that deregulation has fostered in the commercial marketplace
has not lead to destructive bidding practices by the air car-
riers. This suggests that air carriers will not resort to




The goal of this thesis was to develop a revised contract
award structure which would introduce price competition into
the Military Airlift Command's commercial airlift acquisition
program and simultaneously preserve U.S. air carrier support
of the CRAF program. While the product of this study is a
proposal for a revised airlift contract award structure, the
reader is reminded that the study effort was constrained by
the limited time available to perform research and the unavail-
ability of some research materials. Nonetheless, based on the
available information, it appears the revised contract award
structure presented in this thesis is a viable alternative.
Because of the importance of the philosophy underlying the
acquisition of commercial airlift by DoD, several perspectives
of the CRAP program and the attendant airlift acquisition
policy were synthesized in considerable detail in Chapters II,
III, and IV. In these chapters, the study overviewed the re-
quirement for a civilian airlift mobilization base to augment
DoD organic airlift capability, examined the composition and
capabilities of CRAF, and described the acquisition program
and its award structure, i.e., the mobilization base index.
It was pointed out that since the early 1960 's, the United
States' defense policy has dictated the need for a formidable
strategic airlift capability. A history of successive crises
had underscored the importance of long-range airlift capability
to support both U.S. forces overseas and those of our allies.
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The development of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program in
1952 stemmed from an appreciation by the President, Congress,
and the Defense Department that a civilian-military partnership
was necessary to assure that adequate strategic airlift capability
existed to meet national emergencies. Due to a number of short-
comings in the program as originally formulated, it was modified
by a presidentially-approved directive issued by the Secretary
of Defense in 1960. Among the recommended policy changes, which
altered the then existing procurement policies and practices,
were the elimination of competitive bidding procedures, the use
of Civil Aeronautics Board established rates to price military
airlift contracts, and the introduction of a contract award struc-
ture which related the amount of DoD airlift business a carrier
receives annually to that carrier's contribution to CRAF . To-
day, the commercial airlift acquisition program continues as
revised in 1960.
While the policies and procedures instituted in the early
1960 's have been credited to some extent with the modernization
of the reserve air fleet, it is evident that changing CRAF re-
quirements and the changing complexion of the airline industry
dictate the need for DoD to revise current airlift acquisition
policies and procedures. The recent deregulation of the air-
line industry, furthermore, with its emphasis on competition
to determine the quality, variety, and price of services, to-
gether with the CAB's decision to discontinue setting rates
applicable to military airlift are other factors dictating a
need for change. Additionally, the Government has recently
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reaffirmed the principle of competition as a matter of acquisi-
tion policy. Thus, it appears appropriate at this time to
consider the introduction of some form of price competition into
MAC's commercial airlift acquisition program.
The contract award structure developed in Chapter V is
designed not only to introduce price competition into the air-
lift acquisition process but also satisfy MAC's acquisition ob-
jectives which are to obtain airlift services at fair and reas-
onable prices, meet current peacetime airlift requirements, and
maintain an airlift mobilization base responsive to any level
of emergency. It relies on a competitive negotiated process
to award indefinite quantity contracts to multiple contractors.
Based on information available to the author at the time this
thesis was being written, it appears that the proposed method
of awarding contracts is a feasible alternative.
The present airlift acquisition policies and procedures
have formed the basis of the CRAF program for close to 2 years.
The successful implementation of revision to the current air-
lift acquisition program will require considerable coordination
between DoD, MAC, and the air carriers.
Finally, the reader should note that the information pre-
sented in this thesis regarding MAC's recent alterations to its
acquisition policies and procedures may be dated. Due to time
restrictions, research had to be terminated before MAC had final-
ized its fiscal year 198 acquisition program. The situation
with regard to airlift acquisition policies and procedures dur-
ing the research period can best be described as fluid. Thus,
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as new information becomes available, some of the conclusions





RATES AND RULES FOR
FY 80 COMMERCIAL
AUGMENTATION




Military Airlift Command (MAC)
Schedule of Negotiated Uniform Rates and Rules
In accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding between MAC
and carriers willing to participate in the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet (CRAF) program, following are the rates and rules that
apply to air transportation services performed for MAC.
A - Definitions . (1) "Category A transportation" means the
transportation in scheduled service of individually ticketed
passengers or individually waybilled cargo pursuant to contracts
with MAC.
(2) "Category B transportation" means air transportation in
planeload lots of passengers and/or cargo pursuant to contracts
with MAC.
(3) "Category Y transportation" means the round trip movement of
passengers in scheduled service in blocks of 20 or more pax per
flight at the rate established for round trip Category B ser-
vice pursuant to contracts with MAC.
(4) "Category Z transportation" means the transportation in
scheduled service of individually GTR ticketed passengers pur-
suant to filed tariffs.
(5) "Logair" means all-cargo charter service over interstate
routes principally between Air Force installations pursuant to
contracts with MAC.
(6) "Quicktrans" means all-cargo charter service over inter-
state routes principally between Navy installations pursuant
to contracts with MAC.
(7) "Substitute services" means the performance by an air
carrier of air transportation in planeload lots for another air
carrier to fulfill such other air carrier's contractual obliga-
tion to MAC.
(8) "Suspension charge" means the amount to be paid by MAC
to an air carrier, pursuant to terms and conditions of the
contract between the carrier and MAC when a contract charter
flight (other than a Logair or Quicktrans flight) is suspended
by MAC.
B - Rates . The rates for air transportation services shall
not be less than the following:
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(1) For Category B charter services the following rates
apply for all long range aircraft types
:
Passenger Rates, Cents Cargo Rates, Cents
Per Passenger Mile Per Ton Mile
Round Trip One Way Round Trip One Way
3.3075 5.2683 13.8125 22.1293
Provided, that subject to the provisions of paragraph C the
rates set forth above shall not be applicable to passengers
or cargo carried on a particular trip in excess of the amount
that the contract calls for MAC to supply and the carrier to
provide space: and provided further, that if a carrier per-
forms a one-way charter flight carrying nonmilitary traffic
for a nonmilitary user, the carrier may charter the return
flight of that aircraft to MAC at a published one-way charter
traffic rate that is in fact available to the general public
for equivalent services: And, provided further, that payment
of the following charges shall be made in addition to the above
rate for all operations to/from the following stations
:
Narrow Body Wide Body
Aircraft Aircraft
Los Angeles Intl Airport -
Hanover , Germany
And, provided further, that individual carrier payment adjust-
ment factors will be applied each month to the basic rate to
compensate for variances in fuel prices incurred at all required
commercial stations transitted on MAC contract flights and Rhein
Main AB, GE . Each carrier's adjustment will be developed by
computing the percent variance in the average monthly fuel price
in MAC Category B long range operation versus the Defense Fuel
Supply Center standard price of JP-4 fuel and applying this
variance to the weighted average percent that fuel is to the
basic rate. Each month's adjustment factors will be based on
the latest available carrier fuel data (i.e. August 1979 fuel
data used to compute October 197 9 payment adjustment factors)
.
A single weighted average fuel surcharge will be developed for
Categories A, Y & Z service, using the weighted average fuel
costs incurred in the MAC Category B long range operation for
the most current month in which data is available and applied
to the basic rate, provided this average increase is equal to
or greater than one cent per gallon. Fuel reports will be sub-
mitted monthly (by the 20th of the following month) by all car-
riers performing Category B services. This report will be sub-
mitted in the format shown in Appendix A. This data will be
subject to audit verification by DCAA.
74

(2) For Logair and Quicktrans services. (RESERVED)
(3) The compensation for substitute service shall not be
less than that which the prime contractor would have received
under his contract with MAC.
(4) For Category A/Z transportation services:
(a) Category A/Z Passengers - One-way Category B pas-
senger mile rate plus applicable fuel surcharge; provided that,
if a carrier has on file a tariff rate available to the general
public for equivalent unrestricted service which is less than
the above rate, then the tariff rate shall apply.
(b) Category A Cargo - One-way Category B ton mile
rate plus applicable fuel surcharge; provided that, if a car-
rier has on file a tariff available to the general public for
equivalent unrestricted service which is less than the above
rate, then the tariff rate shall apply.
(c) The foregoing rates per passenger mile and per ton
mile shall be applied to the shortest mileage between the com-
mercial air carrier points as set forth in the latest IATA
Mileage Manual used to compute point-to-point passenger rates
and cargo rates per pound.
(d) For cargo services to/from military bases outside
the United States, the rates per pound shall not be less than
the rates to/from the nearest commercial point, computed in
accordance with subparagraphs (b) and (c) of this paragraph.
(e) The cargo rates determined in accordance with sub-
paragraphs (b) through (d) of this paragraph shall be applied
on the basis of a standard weight per pallet of 4,98 pounds
for wide-body aircraft and 3,7 50 pounds for narrow-body aircraft.
(5) For Category Y passenger transportation services -
Round Trip Category B passenger mile rate plus applicable fuel
surcharge.
(6) For suspension charges, 3 6 percent of the rate based
on the passenger charter rate and 38 percent of the rate based
on the cargo charter rate otherwise applicable to the suspended
flight.
C - Aircraft loads . The rates set forth in Para B(l) shall be
applied to the following aircraft loads:
Number of passengers, Number of tons,
Aircraft Types All-passenger flights All-cargo flights
B-747 402 (9 abreast seating) 90














Provided that, if a carrier is prevented from accommodating a
load equal to that specified above for reasons other than ad-
verse weather, off-loading by MAC or bulk of the cargo supplied
by MAC, payment will be based on the actual load, but in no
event less than 90 percent of above loads except for pax air-
craft which are configured for a lesser number of seats in which
case payment will be based on actual number of seats in the air-
craft.
D - Round trip services . Round-trip services means charter ser-
vice other than Logair and Quicktrans services where: (1) Pas-
sengers and/or cargo are transported on two or more successive
revenue flights and the last revenue flight terminates within
250 statute miles of the point of origin of the first revenue
flight or, at a point within 250 statute miles of the car-
rier's operating base; (2) the air carrier operates a follow-
on flight from the terminating station of a previous flight
within 7 2 hours after arrival; (3) the air carrier operates en
route not more than one ferry flight not exceeding 50 statute
miles without compensation; and (4) the air carrier operates
en route ferry flights in excess of 50 statute miles for com-
pensation equal to not less than 7 5% of the round-trip cargo
rate for all ferry miles operated, regardless of whether the
live flight is a passenger or cargo flight. In the event the
air carrier operates a flight where the distance between the
originating and terminating points exceeds 250 statute miles
and the terminating station is not within 250 statute miles
of the carrier's operating base or the carrier does not operate
a follow-on flight from the terminating station within 7 2 hours,
the compensation shall be 7 5% of the round-trip cargo rate for
the distance between the originating and terminating points.
E - On-loading and off-loading of traffic . MAC will be per-
mitted to on-load and/or off-load traffic (passenger or cargo)
at any operational stops ai route made for the carrier's con-
venience, to the extent that it does not interfere with the
carrier's scheduled ground operation.
F - Computation of passenger-miles and cargo ton-miles for pay
purposes .
(1) General Rule. The computation of passenger-miles and cargo
ton-miles for charter service shall be based on no lesser mileage
than the nonstop great-circle airport-to-airport distance, in
terms of statute miles from the point of origin of the revenue
flight to the point of destination of such flight, via such
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intermediate points as are required to be served by the terms
of the MAC contract. If the direct nonstop airport-to-airport
distance from the point of origin of the revenue flight to the
point of destination of such flight, or between any pair of
points comprising a route segment required to be served by
the terms of the MAC contract, is 4,000 miles or more and no
intermediate points are required to be served by the terms of
the contract or are specified in paragraph (2) of this section,
the mileage shall be computed via the routings which yield the
shortest mileage.
(2) Pacific Services. In the case of Pacific services, the
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and the UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
It is the purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding to
establish guidelines to facilitate the solicitation, negotiation
and placement of Department of Defense contracts for airlift
services with air carriers certificated by the Civil Aeronautics
Board ("CAB") under authority of the Federal Aviation Act of
1948, as amended, that are willing to participate in the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet ("CRAF") program. The objectives of the CRAF
Program are to augment the airlift capability of the Military
Airlift Command ("MAC") and to assume a mobilization base of
aircraft available to the Department of Defense for use in the
event of any level of national emergency. MAC has managed the
CRAF program utilizing CAB established rates for many years;
however, the recently announced intention of the CAB to discon-
tinue establishing minimum rates for Department of Defense air-
lift service contracts necessitates the development of new guide-
lines for use in managing the CRAF program.
By joint agreement on December 15, 1951, the Secretaries of
Commerce and Defense established the CRAF program to augment
military airlift capability during formally declared national
emergencies. In response to Executive Order 10999, February 20,
1962, 27 F.R. 1527, which directed the Secretary of Commerce to
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prepare national emergency plans designed to develop a state of
readiness with respect to all degrees of national emergency, the
CRAF program was expanded. On August 8, 1963, in a Memorandum of
Understanding the Secretaries of Commerce and Defense jointly
recognized "the requirement for incremental activation of the
CRAF to meet varying defense emergency needs for the civil air-
lift augmentation to the military airlift capability" and di-
rected a change in the CRAF program to reflect this requirement.
To meet this requirement, the award of Department of Defense
airlift service contracts has been structured to insure that a
mobilization base of aircraft capable of responding to any level
of defense emergency will be available to the Department of
Defense. (Since 1961, the Department of Transportation has been
created and the transportation functions of the Department of
Commerce have been transferred to it. Also, E.O. 10999 has been
revoked and its provisions have been incorporated into E.O. 114 90,
October 30, 1969, 34 F.R. 17567, which consolidates the assignment
of emergency preparedness functions to the various departments
and agencies.)
DOD Directive 5160.2 17 October 1973, establishes a Single
Manager Assignment for Airlift Service within the Department of
Defense and designates the Secretary of the Air Eorce as the Single
Manager. The Directive requires that the Secretary establish and
organize a Single Manager Operating Agency for Airlift Service
and designate a general officer to direct the operations of the
Agency as its Executive Director. MAC has been designated the
Single Manager Operating Agency for Airlift Service. One of
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MAC's functions as Single Manager Operating Agency is to aug-
ment the airlift capacity of the Agency as required to meet re-
quirements through the use of commercial airlift service in a
manner which will contribute to the sound economic development
of an increased modern civil airlift capacity and will enhance
the ability of civil carriers to operate with maximum effective-
ness in support of the military forces in time of war. For many
years MAC has accomplished this through the negotiation and a-
ward of DOD airlift-service contracts to U.S. air carriers which
own or otherwise control aircraft suitable for allocation to the
CRAF at CAB established minimum rates in a manner consistent
with the objectives of the CRAF program.
Because the CAB has announced its intention to discontinue
establishing rates for DOD airlift service contracts, MAC must
now devise a means of pricing these contracts that produces fair
and reasonable rates and preserves the mobilization base. The
parties to the Memorandum of Understanding agree that the CAB
methodology by which minimum rates for DOD airlift service con-
tracts were established was an effective means of establishing
fair and reasonable rates and furthering the objectives of the
CRAF program; therefore, the parties agree to the continued use
of the CAB-established methodology, to the extent reasonably
practicable, in their negotiation of rates for future DOD air-
lift service contracts. In furtherance of this agreement and as
a condition of its continued participation in the CRAF program,
(carrier) agrees to furnish MAC with the financial and operational
information which MAC requests, and MAC agrees to conduct an
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annual review of this information and to negotiate with the
(carrier) to determine (carrier's) projected costs that would
properly be allocable to any future DOD airlift service contract.
MAC further agrees to use cost information derived through the
negotiation with (carrier) and the CAB-established methodology
to determine an appropriate, uniform rate for pricing DOD air-
lift service contracts. If issues arise during this process
which cannot be resolved by negotiation, MAC and (carrier) also
agree that the issues shall be submitted to the Secretary of the
Air Force (or, pursuant to a Secretarial delegation, to an Assis-
tant Secretary or the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals)
for resolution and that the Secretary's (or the Secretary's
delegatee's) decision will bind both parties.
This MOU will be effective for a period of five years.
Either party may terminate this MOU by giving the other party
notice of its intention to terminate within 90 days after Octob-
er 1st in any year included in the five year period.
MAC will continue its historic practice of dividing the
military peacetime airlift among carriers based upon their con-
tributions to the three stages of potential CRAF emergencies
—
peacetime committed expansion, defense airlift emergencies de-
clared by the Secretary of Defense, and national emergency
declared by the President or the Congress of the United States.
As in the past, carrier participation in MAC Airlift Program
will be wholly voluntary. Any properly certificated carrier may
participate in the CRAF program if it offers aircraft useful to
CRAF, agrees to the conditions of this Memorandum and executes
a standard form MAC contract.
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The parties understand that this Memorandum of Understanding
imposes no financial obligation upon either party. The placement
and pricing of DOD airlift service contracts and (carrier's)
commitment of aircraft to the CRAF program will be accomplished
by the formal award of the airlift service contracts after soli-
citation and negotiation in compliance with the DAR.
(Carrier) United States Air Force
by by
CTNCMAC, Director of Single
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